, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees involving Council of Europe Member
[hereinafter Council of Europe June 2007 Report] , available at http://assembly.coe.int/ Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf.
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:281 mation about the Program; still unknown are the exact number and identities of people subject to K-C-D orders, the number and identities of people rendered to third countries for interrogation, the number and identities of individuals held in secret CIA "black sites," and the number killed through operation of a K-C-D order. Concerning transfers to foreign governments, the estimates range from about 100 to several thousand. The best guess for "black sites" is that about three dozen individuals have been held in such facilities. 3 The number of people who have been summarily killed is unknown.
Despite this secrecy, we know a significant amount about the Program through selective government disclosures 4 and the stories of those who have emerged from it. We know about extraordinary rendition through Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen wrongly identified as an al Qaeda member, who was transferred from New York to Syria where he was detained and tortured for about a year before being released. We know about the secret detention program through Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen who was wrongly accused of being an al Qaeda member, abducted in Macedonia and sent to a secret CIA prison in Afghanistan, where he was held for five months and subjected to coercive interrogation.
5
In contrast with the government's attempts to keep secret certain facts about the Program, the United States has not been quiet about its legal justifications. Indeed, the U.S. government has actively made a series of legal arguments aimed at justifying the Program. Although those who defend the Program do not explicitly support the use of informal transfer due to a risk of torture, prolonged incommunicado detention, or targeted killings, defenders of the Program imply that it is legal by pointing to what they claim are lacunae in the relevant legal frameworks. 6 The administration suggests that where lacunae are found, prohibitions give way to permission; territories outside the United States are conceptual- The relevant human rights norms protecting against extraordinary rendition and secret detention include the following: the prohibition of refoulement, which proscribes transfers of people to places where they will likely be subjected to torture; the prohibition of enforced disappearances, which proscribes the concealment of the fate and whereabouts of individuals deprived of their liberty; and the norm against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
14 I will briefly summarize these norms in the context of the extraordinary rendition and secret detention program.
The prohibition of refoulement is set out in a wide variety of human rights instruments. Most relevant today is the Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment ("Torture Convention" or "the Convention"). CAT Article 3 prohibits the transfer of individuals to States where they may be in danger of torture: "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." 15 This article has been interpreted to apply to all forms of interState transfer of individuals, and therefore applies to informal transfers such as rendition, in which a person is abducted and forcibly transferred without any recourse to review procedures. When extraordinary rendition involves transfer to a country where an individual is at real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the transfer is prohibited by binding international human rights law.
16
14 Also relevant but not addressed here are, among others, rights against arbitrary detention, rights to consular access, and due process rights.
15 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, ¶ 1, Dec. 10, 1984 , S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988 16 As the CAT Committee has explained: "The Committee is concerned that the State party considers that the non-refoulement obligation, under Article 3 of the Convention, does not extend to a person detained outside its territory. The Committee is also concerned by the State party's rendition of suspects, without any judicial procedure, to States where they face a real risk of torture (art. 3). The State party should apply the non-refoulement guarantee to all detainees in its custody, cease the rendition of suspects, in particular by its intelligence agencies, to States where they face a real risk of torture, in order to comply with its obligations under article 3 of the Conven- 
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Transfers to secret detention are likewise prohibited, in part because prolonged incommunicado detention like that which detainees experience in CIA "black sites" has itself been found to constitute-at minimum-cruel and inhuman treatment.
17
When combined with coercive interrogation techniques, this kind of secret detention regime is more properly identified as one that entails torture. In addition, there is no doubt that secret detention is-in itself-unlawful under international human rights law. The U.N. Committee Against Torture has found that secret detention is a per se violation of the Torture Convention.
18 Further, when carried out in the manner used in the Program, secret detention amounts to enforced disappearance, 19 which is unlawful under customary international law.
20
III. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF GENERAL COMMENT 2 TO CLOSING U.S. "LOOPHOLES" The U.S. government has focused a great deal of energy in the last several years on efforts to carve out legal space for its actions in the "war on terror." Instead of simply acting as a scofflaw, the United States has systematically produced legal arguments, pursuant to both international and domestic law, to support its actions.
21
In relation to the extraordinary rendition and secret detention Program, the strategy has been to try to clear a space for actions 17 
A. Clarification of the Scope of Application of the Torture Convention
The first argument the United States advances in support of its rendition program is that human rights law only applies within the territory of a ratifying State-in other words, that human rights norms do not apply extraterritorially. In its reports to the United Nations treaty bodies monitoring the implementation of human rights treaties, the United States has consistently maintained that, unless explicitly specified otherwise, the United States is bound by human rights treaties only in activities it conducts within U.S. territory. 22 In other words, if you are outside the United States but under the control of the U.S. government, you are unprotected by human rights norms. Thus, the United States asserts, it is not bound by Article 3 of the Convention when acting outside its territory.
General Comment 2 clarifies the scope of application of the Torture Convention, affirming that the phrase "any territory under its jurisdiction," used in a number of key provisions in the Convention, refers to any territory, facility, or person under the de jure or de facto control of a State party.
23 This is a crucial clarification in the law.
The U.S. argument that the non-refoulement rule does not apply outside of its territory was unconvincing even before the promulgation of General Comment 2-in part because Article 3 does not specify a territorial scope at all. Instead, it states a clear obligation of States: not to transfer a person to another State where he is at risk of torture. 24 Many have argued that this plainly applies to any individual under the de facto control of a State party, to no avail. Feb. 9, 2000) . 23 Recommendations of the CAT, supra note 18. 
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cles that do specify a territorial scope of application apply to any location or person under the effective control of a State party, the U.S. position vis-à-vis Article 3 is even weaker. It would be absurd to say that even though a U.S. detention facility on foreign territory is covered by the obligation to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment set out in Article 16, the prohibition of non-refoulement set out in Article 3 does not apply to someone that U.S. agents abduct in Jordan because that person is not in U.S. territory. Indeed, such an argument appears incoherent. This clarification about territoriality is extremely relevant to the destination for many individuals subject to the extraordinary rendition program: so-called CIA "black sites," where "enhanced interrogation techniques" or "alternative procedures" such as sleep deprivation, sensory manipulation, and even waterboarding have been authorized and used.
26 For many years, however, the United States has interpreted Article 16-requiring States to prohibit cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment-to apply only to the U.S. territory. This interpretation, while not overtly argued, was plainly relied upon by the CIA in designing the "enhanced interrogation techniques," which would only be used in "black sites" far from U.S. territory. Indeed, when the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to those apprehended and detained in connection with the "war on terror," the CIA moved to shut down the secret detention program, and CIA agents began to buy personal liability insurance. 27 It was thus clear that the CIA feared that the interrogation techniques used in secret detention were violations of Common Article 3's prohibition on inhumane treatment. Had the United States accepted that the Convention's Article 16 applied to these facilities from the outset of the "war on terror," the "alternative procedures"-which plainly amount at least to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by the Torture Conventionperhaps would never have been approved.
B. The Non-Derogable Nature of the Prohibition of Torture
Another crucial contribution of General Comment 2 is that it emphasizes the non-derogability of the prohibition on torture. The General Comment underlines that no circumstances whatsoever-including "threat of terrorist acts" or either international or NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:281 non-international armed conflict-may be invoked to avoid or dilute the obligations set out in the Convention.
28
This clarification is badly needed in light of U.S. legal arguments that treat international humanitarian law as the only relevant law applicable to the "war on terror." Extraordinary rendition and secret detention often take place far from any traditional battlefield. Whether these operations qualify as part of an armed conflict governed by humanitarian law-either its authorizing norms or its limiting rules-is hotly contested. 29 Of course, humanitarian law authorizes-or at least accepts-the use of lethal force by privileged combatants (armies and militias that follow the rules of war), and limits the use of force and coercion in relation to protected persons (including prisoners of war, civilians, and those placed hors de combat because of injury or sickness). 30 In relation to extraordinary rendition, the question is what law applies to the transfer and the secret detention of individuals the United States asserts are unlawful combatants in a new kind of war.
In this new kind of war, the United States claims that it is engaged in an armed conflict against al Qaeda-or more broadly, against terrorism 31 -in which the entire world is literally a battle- 28 Recommendations of the CAT, supra note 16. 29 In launching its attacks on Afghanistan, the Administration declared that it was engaged in an international armed conflict. At first, this approach was largely accepted by the international community: the magnitude of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were deemed sufficient to trigger the inherent right of self-defense, and few countries argued that it was unlawful or inappropriate to target the Taliban as well as al Qaeda in response. The controversy began when the United States declared that detainees picked up on the battlefield in Afghanistan were not entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions-neither the Third Geneva Convention (which protects prisoners of war) nor the Fourth Convention (which protects civilians). See, e.g., Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales on Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban to the President (Jan. 25, 2002) AFF. 55 (2003) . 31 As Marco Sassòli explains: Astonishingly . . . the administration proceeded to declare that it was engaged in a single worldwide international armed conflict against a non-State actor (Al-Qaeda) or perhaps also against a social or criminal phenomenon (terrorism) if not a moral category (evil). This worldwide conflict started-without the United States characterizing it as such at that time-at some point in the 1990s and will continue until victory. Marco Sassòli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 LAW & INEQ. 195, 197-98 (2004) .
